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Abstract
This article introduces the conflictual theory of law as a new way of understanding 
laws as struggles over meaning, in which actors create and circulate social knowledge 
to justify their interpretation of rights. The theory addresses law-production processes 
and underlying knowledge/power constructs, for example, in legislative deliberations 
and interactions between politicians and the media. It shares pragmatist commit-
ments to a highly participative version of democracy, attained through the active in-
volvement of all members of society in democratic processes and rejects claims of 
universally applicable legal “truths” in favour of the constant (re)negotiation of laws 
between members immediately affected by a law. Pragmatism’s antifoundationalism 
challenges the dualism between citizens and non-citizens, facilitating the inclusion of 
the latter in legislative deliberations.
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Despite the global human rights imagination’s ongoing crisis (Hopgood 2013), 
its universalist justification for rights remains firmly entrenched in the institu-
tional self-understanding of legal systems in many of the world’s liberal de-
mocracies. In a particularly stark example, the Basic Law of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (Basic Law) mirrors the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(udhr) in its commitment to ‘inviolable and inalienable human rights as the 
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basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world’ (Article 1(2)). 
This natural law conception of rights as fundamental and a-priori has been 
equated with Germany’s entry into the community of Western democracies 
(Fraenkel 2011, 90) and to the origin of the German state (Rolin 2005). Yet liber-
alism’s ahistorical and undifferentiated justifications, of what are undeniably 
important principles for the protection of human life and dignity, are unable to 
account for the pluralism intrinsic to social histories and human experiences.
The experiences of irregular migrants1 exemplify the inadequacy of univer-
salist conceptions of rights and their safeguarding by legal regimes. Irregular 
migrants are typically confronted with insufficient human rights safeguards, 
both in their countries of origin and throughout their migration trajectory. Al-
legedly universalistic rights remain dependent on their recognition in law and 
enforcement by nation states and are, thus, contingent on citizenship of a 
rights protecting state or on a state’s decision to protect the human rights of 
certain groups of non-citizens. The precariousness and vulnerability encoun-
tered by irregular migrants, even within the legal regime of their host-country, 
often coincides with restrictions on employment, constant threats of deporta-
tion, restrictions on mobility and, hence, highly conditional access to human 
rights protection. An absence of citizenship rights in the host-country further 
undermines each irregular migrant’s political voice and entrenches their sub-
ordinated status within the host-community. As such, universalistic justifica-
tions have left irregular migrants and other typically marginalised actors un-
able to articulate human rights claims or to define the types of legal recognition 
they seek within their (new) communities. The figure of the irregular migrant 
will continue to accompany us throughout this article, in order to illustrate the 
practical implications of the arguments formulated herein.
In order to counteract the universalist justification for rights intrinsic to nat-
ural law theory and the liberal paradigm, this article offers a new theorisation 
of laws as social struggles over meaning, in which socio-political actors cre-
ate and circulate social knowledge both to justify their interpretation of legal 
rights and to institutionalise these interpretations as laws. In accordance with 
pragmatist commitments to radical pluralism and democratic participation, 
the conflictual theory of law offers a basis for including all those potentially 
affected by a law within continuous processes of law production,  challenge 
1 Irregular migration is defined as ‘the movement of people across borders without the explicit 
sanction of the receiving state’ (McNevin 2017, 255). Hence, irregular migrants include refu-
gees, asylum seekers and, so-called, “economic migrants”. Moreover, the term irregular migra-
tion accounts for the fluidity of migration statuses and the contestation of distinctions be-
tween different attempts to categorize migrants (McNevin 2011, 19).
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and amendment. This inclusive theorisation of the law-making accords sig-
nificance to the rights- and recognition claims of diverse and fluid groups and 
challenges static conceptions of citizenship in favour of an open-ended partic-
ipatory processes. Thus, according to the conflictual theory of law, laws emerge 
as temporary solutions to social problems, which are themselves intersubjec-
tively constructed by socio-political actors. These laws remain contested and 
are justified by their problem solving ability for all those affected by the laws in 
question. Each justification is contextually situated and dynamic, in line with 
underlying societal change.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: The first section sets 
out the pragmatist philosophical basis of the conflictual theory of law, includ-
ing its underlying theory of truth and implications for democracy and creative 
action. The second section evaluates competing social theorisations of laws 
both for their correspondence with the philosophical commitments set out in 
the first section and for their democratic implications. The third section builds 
on a social conception of laws to advance the conflictual theory of law, rooted 
in a combination of pragmatism and the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to 
Discourse (skad).2 The conflictual theory of law recognises the material impli-
cations of intersubjective meaning creation between socio-political actors, 
particularly through the institutionalisation of knowledge constructs and dis-
cursive formations as law.
 American Pragmatism as a Justification for Democracy and Law
American Pragmatism’s significance for the conflictual theory of law is evident 
in in its conception of truth as well as its implications for democratic politics 
and law-making processes therein. Pragmatism has its origins in the ideas of 
the founders of the Metaphysical Club in 1872, namely Peirce, James and the 
future United States Supreme Court Justice Holmes. Pragmatists question 
the existence of ‘basic or incorrigible truths’, despite affirming the foundation 
of knowledge in tacitly held beliefs about the universe (Peirce 1974, 394–397; 
Bernstein 2010b, 34–36). Their commitments to fallibilism and empirical scien-
tific inquiry result in processes taking on a central role in the assessment of 
2 skad is a framework for discourse analysis, which stresses the importance of reconstruction 
through both empirical research and interpretive theorisation (Keller 2017, 62, 65). This ap-
proach pushes back against readings of Foucault that reject interpretation (as a quest for true 
meanings) and opposes academic relativism (Keller 2005, 11). Thus, Keller seeks to ‘translate 
some Foucauldian insights on discourse into sociological theory building’ based on a social 
constructivist tradition that accords greater significance to actors and practices (2005, 2).
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truth claims. While there is some disagreement between Peirce and James 
about the nature of truth, pragmatists share a belief in the idea that truth(s) 
can be arrived at through argument, experience and the convergence of rea-
soned opinion over time (Hookway 2002, 2013).
Despite rejecting epistemic universals, and, hence, refusing to accept cur-
rent truths as absolute, pragmatism is not relativist (James 1907, 106). Rather, 
by rejecting Cartesian dualisms James suggests that a researcher must neither 
uphold fictions of ‘ultimate fixed foundations’ nor descend into ‘foundation-
less relativism’ (Bernstein 2010b, 54). By recognising humans as ‘in certain 
practical respects, creators of knowledge and truth’ Peirce and James are able 
to dismiss the relativist ‘fantasy of global doubt’, recognising instead the inher-
ent conservatism of ones pre-existing beliefs and the practical consequences 
of such beliefs and their amendment (Malachowski 2013, 40–41, 44–45). Taken 
together these commitments suggest that, rather than abandoning evidentiary 
standards for practical efficacy, new beliefs must fit into existing working sys-
tems of belief and behavior unless the new beliefs, ‘when distributed through-
out the human–world continuum, make the whole set up function in tangibly 
better ways, or do not damage it appreciably’ (Malachowski 2013, 45–46). This 
processual approach to truth accords with human inability to achieve a ‘God’s 
Eye view’ (Putnam 1981) and the ensuing need for ‘critical engagement with 
other points of view and with other visions’ (Bernstein 2010b, 62).
The conception of truth around pluralistic inquiry helps the researcher 
challenge allegedly fixed and universal legal “truths” in favour of the constant 
(re)negotiation of laws between social actors. This need for engaged inquiry is 
compatible with Peirce’s assertion that the community of inquirers is never 
fixed (Peirce 1974, 221) and James’ assertion that a belief in pluralism also trig-
gers an ethical commitment to assuming that groups do not have static identi-
ties (Bernstein 2010b, 69). These epistemic commitments have implications for 
determining who should take part in social problem and solutions definition 
processes, including through democratic politics and legislative amendments. 
Thus, as elaborated in the next section, the pragmatist epistemology of discov-
ering truth through prolonged pluralistic inquiry becomes the basis for evalu-
ating legislative validity claims.
The significance of pragmatist conceptions of truth and pluralistic inquiry 
for democracy and law are explicit in the scholarship of Dewey, who views 
democracy as a form of government that goes beyond the electoral arithmetic 
of majority, focusing instead on ‘the process by which the majority is formed’ 
as well as ways in which the ‘minority are represented in the policy which they 
force the majority to accept in order to be a majority’ (1888, 8–10). Dewey’s 
early writings should not be misunderstood as a denial of social conflict or the 
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imposition of a unified will (Westbrook 1991, 40). Rather, different competing 
interests and conflicts are necessary drivers for both justice and social reform, 
since they provide the basis of deliberation and for the definition of social 
problems and solutions. As such, the knowledge underlying decision making 
in Dewey’s highly participative version of radical democracy is attained 
through the active involvement of all members of society in democratic pro-
cesses. Hildebrandt argues that Dewey’s pragmatism has a ‘melioristic motive’, 
which views life as improvable ‘primarily through intelligent, human effort’ 
(Hildebrandt 2013, 59). Such creative conflict requires a pluralistic culture that 
allows for and encourages differences of opinion and debate to resolve social 
problems (Bernstein 2010b, 80, 85, 86; 2010a, 302). Within the continuously im-
provable practice of democracy ‘deliberation of all those affected by a deci-
sion would be superior to any other possible method of inquiry’ (Bohman 2010, 
189, 199).
Thus, a case can be made for including irregular migrants, members of their 
host communities and civil society groups engaging with migrants in the po-
litical deliberation and law-making processes that effect their condition within 
this (new) community. Further, while democratic progress can be achieved by 
improving deliberative inquiry in cooperative practices, ‘normative practical 
inquiry must seek to extend the scope of political possibilities rather than sim-
ply accept the facts and the institutions that produce and stabilize them as 
fixing the limits of political possibilities once and for all’ (Bohman 2010, 200–
201). Members of society are called to consciously reflect on social reality and 
the changes occurring therein in order to creatively adjust their institutions in 
response to the critical evaluation and deliberation of social facts. As such, 
Dewey emphasises that ‘[d]emocracy as a way of life’ requires ‘faith in the po-
tentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human being 
irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural wealth’ 
and a belief in human equality (1988, 2).
Beyond Dewey’s pragmatist account of democracy, Silva argues that Mead 
offers scholars a communicative social theory ‘that systematically connects 
science’s problem-solving nature to democracy’s deliberative character by 
means of social psychology that establishes the social nature of the human self ’ 
(2007b, 291–293). The intersubjective construction and reconstruction of  so-
cial realty by ‘taking the role of the other’ becomes the mind-set of social psy-
chologists, researchers in the sciences and participants in democratic  politics 
(Silva 2007b, 291, 296). Thus, social progress is about harnessing sympathy, by 
assuming the role of the other, and science, as experimental innovation based 
on the scientific method (Mead 1910 in Rigney and Lundy 2015, 167–168).
Mead’s theory of action highlights the ‘tension between the creativity of ac-
tion and the communicative character of human sociability’ (Joas 1990, 167). 
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Ends are not set ‘outside the context of action’ and instead emerge as ‘the  result 
of reflection on resistances encountered by the variously oriented behavior’ of 
participants in a social context. This interpretation applies to how parliamen-
tarians advance and deliberate new laws, particularly in light of the resistance 
encountered within parties or coalitions, from courts and other external stake-
holders as well as from discourses and narratives put forward by other parlia-
mentarians. Extrapolating these principles to the social level, Mead believed 
that social order was not achieved through normative consensus but instead 
through the capacity of a collective to successfully resolve social problems 
(Joas 1990, 185–186). This approach should not be misunderstood as a positiv-
istic faith in the permanent resolution of political and moral problems using 
scientific methods. Rather, the scientific approach should be viewed as a fruit-
ful method for resolving specific cognitive challenges, not postulating univer-
sal maxims (Joas 1990, 188).
 A Deeply Social Conception of Laws
As an antifoundational philosophy, theorists have interpreted pragmatism in 
divergent, sometimes contradictory ways. In theorising the nature of laws, 
some interpretations attempt to strip pragmatism of its normative implica-
tions, thus severing the link between pragmatism’s epistemology and the im-
plications thereof for validity claims. These theorisations suggest that pragma-
tism views law as nothing more than context specific experimentation, offering 
no guidance as to what types of laws or legislative processes are socially desir-
able. One such challenge for linking pragmatism, radical democracy and their 
implications for a social conception of laws is posed by Rorty, who alleges that 
‘[t]he bridge […] between epistemic and political democracy is too flimsy to 
carry heavy traffic’ (Posner 2003, 113 in Rorty 2007, 918). Rorty suggests that ‘by 
now pragmatism is banal in its application to law’, as judicial practice has gen-
erally recognised the value of experience over universal logics (1990, 1811). In 
this reading of pragmatism both democracy and law are left entirely without 
moral or political direction.
A rebuttal of Rorty’s interpretation might begin by highlighting pragma-
tism’s essential anti-dualism and, hence, the refusal to draw firm distinctions 
between ends and means. Faber recognises that Dewey strongly opposed in-
strumentalism, suggesting instead that means were ‘themselves part of the 
consequences of a decision’ (1988, 1345). It emerges unmistakably from Mead’s 
systematic linkage of scientific inquiry, deliberative democracy and social psy-
chology through ‘taking on the role of the other’ that pragmatism can offer 
an inclusive, pluralistic method for resolving social problems, whether these 
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 pertain to law, democratic politics or other matters. Mead and Rorty would 
agree that the constant reconstitution of society does not follow a-priori, uni-
versalist maxims. Thus, Rorty defends epistemic antifoundationalism by high-
lighting the importance of defending legal premises based on their practical 
consequences, not reference to a higher authority (1992, 719, 720).
While agreeing with this sentiment, Mead goes beyond Rorty in suggesting 
that pragmatist inquirers are guided in their proposals by procedural commit-
ments to scientific rigour, pluralistic inquiry and engagement with the ‘gener-
alised other’ in order to achieve moral progress, which can manifest in better, 
more just laws for all members of society (Silva 2013, 463). As recognised by 
Silva, Mead’s communicative theory of society connects democracy, law and 
ethics by envisioning an ideal political community where social order is based 
on rational arguments, mutual understanding and, hence, constant ‘intelligent 
social reconstruction’ in response to social change (2007b, 298, 301). This intel-
ligent social reconstruction, and moral reconstruction in particular, is guided 
by a proceeduralist belief in a ‘democratic and experimental moral method’ 
(Silva 2007b, 303). In accordance with the pragmatist method, laws can be in-
terpreted as demarcations of temporary compromise within an ongoing trajec-
tory of social reconstitution and reform. When merged with commitments to 
radical pluralism and open-ended inquiry, the processes underlying legal 
change can be conceived of as either converging on pluralistic and inclusive 
ideals (for example by opening legal deliberation to affected but previously 
disenfranchised members of the society) or moving away from the same (for 
example by actively excluding directly affected members of the society from 
legislative deliberations). Thus, rejecting epistemic universals does not entail 
moral relativism. Rather, validity claims can be evaluated based on their ability 
to inclusively address situated social problems. Pluralistic and inclusive prac-
tices create ideal conditions for the emergence of creativity and hence the con-
tinuous reconstruction of existing legal frameworks in ways that better meet 
the needs of society as a whole.
Contra Rorty, Misak uses Peirce’s commitment to true beliefs, as those that 
are sustainable across as many diverse experiences as possible and over time, 
to argue that laws can be evaluated both based on the procedures by which 
they were devised and by assessing whether the reasons for a law stand up to 
prolonged pluralistic inquiry (2017, 285, 296, 304). Similarly, Joas suggests that 
Rorty systematically ignored the ‘truly radical element’ of both Dewey and 
Mead’s critique of existing political institutions and their ability to realise the 
democratic ideals envisioned in classical pragmatism (1990, 190). As a result, 
Rorty’s philosophical relativism misses the potential that Dewey and Mead ac-
cord to philosophy as a means of social reconstruction and reform (Joas 1990, 
190); a process in which law plays an essential role in institutionalising each 
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reconstruction of social reality and its rules. Dewey made this commitment 
explicit, when emphasising that ‘philosophy is not a special road to something 
alien to ordinary beliefs, knowledge, action, enjoyment, and suffering. It is 
rather a criticism, a critical viewing, of just these familiar things. It differs from 
other criticism only in trying to carry it further and to pursue it methodically’ 
(1930, 23). As such, creativity and criticism including of existing legal and dem-
ocratic institutions ‘cannot be separated’, criticism being the ‘friend and ally’ of 
creative production and social reform (Dewey 1930, 12, 21).
In line with the rebuttal of Rorty’s reluctant neopragmatic approach, Silva 
postulates a neo-Meadian alternative to ‘liberal political theory’ and its natural 
law inspired, individualistic, material and universal justification for rights, ac-
corded a-priori to individuals as a result of their sheer humanity. He contends 
that rights are the product of social processes of imagination, contest, imple-
mentation and denial, which have the effect of ‘constituting action’ (2013, 458). 
By defining rights as mutual relations consisting of political claims that have 
the ability to constitute ‘individuals into citizens’ and to constrain human ac-
tion, Silva recognises the contingency and situated nature of rights claims and 
their perpetual vulnerability to social attitudes and political processes. This 
contingency is particularly apparent with respect to those members of society, 
who are neither accorded the political rights of citizenship nor access to the 
comprehensive human rights protection imagined by liberal theorists and in-
scribed in international treaties such as the udhr and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (echr).
As alluded to throughout this article, irregular migrants constitute a com-
patibility problem between universal formulations of human rights and the 
question of access to those rights through what Arendt terms the ‘right to have 
rights’ within a nation state (1973, 296). Specifically, ‘[f]or Arendt, the problem 
for the stateless was political membership,—that without citizenship, refugees 
had no state to uphold their rights’ and, hence, the ‘right to have rights’  includes 
a claim for membership in the political community of a refugee’s host state 
and a right to political participation therein (Hirsch and Bell 2017, 422, 425). 
Arendt recognises this incompatibility as a major challenge to liberalism, 
which is ostensibly committed to both ‘an unwavering respect for human 
rights’ and to state sovereignty, including a state’s control over its borders 
(Lamey 2011, 235). The conflictual theory of law advanced at the end of this 
article addresses the demands of irregular migrants within a given nation state, 
as a particularly vulnerable segment of society and makes the case for recog-
nising and incorporating them into the negotiations that define the breadth 
and depth of human rights protections accorded by that state.
In light of Silva’s recognition that rights are the product of historically 
 contingent social processes (2013), it is these negotiations of rights and their 
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institutionalisation as laws that must be the focus of a deeply social concep-
tion of rights, not the abstract and ahistorical prescriptions of natural law. 
As alluded to throughout this article, American Pragmatism, particularly in 
the iterations of Mead and Dewey provides insights into how such processes 
should ideally be conducted. In accordance with the commitment to pluralis-
tic  inquiry using a large, diverse and open-ended group of inquirers, legislative 
processes should constitute a critical engagement with existing, contextually 
situated legal frameworks in order to assess whether these institutions reflect 
the social circumstances, experiences and social problem constructions there-
in. This processual lens allows the researcher to question the rigid dichotomy 
between citizenship- and human rights (Silva 2013, 459), which is drawn by 
most national constitutions, including, for example, the German Basic Law.3 By 
seeking to broaden the groups of participants in processes that enact or amend 
legislation to all members of society that are affected by a policy, whether they 
are citizens or not, the potential for creative social reform is harnessed. This 
conclusion harmonises with Mead’s internationalist instincts and his recogni-
tion that political conversation in strictly nationalist terms falls short of the 
ideal of the ‘generalised other’ (Silva 2007b, 300).
From this perspective, it seems natural to recognise and include irregular 
migrants within a state’s political community and, hence, its contemplation of 
the ‘generalised other’. This form of political membership is justified both by 
irregular migrants’ presence within a state’s territory and by the direct effect 
that the regulation of migration and asylum has on them. Pluralist inclusion 
can be achieved by other socio-political actors entering communicative rela-
tionships with irregular migrants, which entails recognising and contemplat-
ing their predicaments and demands within the legislative process, as an inter-
subjective arena of rights contestation. It is important to emphasise that the 
context-dependent and communicative setting of ends does not depend on all 
socio-political actors achieving either normative consensus or a homogeneous 
outlook for the creative resolution of social problems to succeed. Rather, ‘the 
solution of moral problems requires creative intellectual accomplishments 
and the taking into account of all the values that are relevant in the situation 
in question’ (Joas 1990, 182). As such, the normative implications of Mead’s 
3 The Basic Law accords specific rights of democratic participation, such as the freedom of 
assembly (Article 8, Basic Law), the right to form societies and associations (Article 9, Basic 
Law) and the freedom of movement within Germany (Article 11, Basic Law) specifically to 
citizens.
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‘communicative type of rationality’ emerge from its procedural commitments: 
‘The solution of moral problems lies in being able to have the widest  perspective 
possible so that all the conflicting points of view, interests, or ends are fully 
appreciated’ (Silva 2007b, 303).
Since ‘there is no unequivocal criterion for the success of problem solving 
other than that of those concerned with and affected by the problem’ (Joas 
1990, 185, 186), the preconditions for the creative resolution of social problems 
through law lies in critical reflection on existing legal and institutional frame-
works and their consequences. When approaching a social problem defined 
around a moral issue, Mead suggests that this ‘problematic situation’ can be 
reconstructed either by deductively reaffirming old meanings in relation to the 
problem or inductively searching for new meanings, the latter being ‘superior 
since it treats moral problems as occasions for moral growth’ (Silva 2007a, 56). 
For example, when confronted with increasing irregular migration, political 
decision makers have the opportunity to rethink existing legal frameworks for 
regulating migration, which often fail to explicitly account for several of the 
principal causes of irregular migration including extreme poverty and environ-
mental catastrophes. Thus, a pragmatist ‘ethics does not elucidate the validity 
of the ultimate values, but instead attempts to reconstruct empirically the pro-
cedure for resolving situations requiring moral decisions in such a way that in 
it a procedure becomes recognizable that can itself serve as a basis for its own 
self-perfecting’ (Joas 1990, 183). Specifically, the Meadian ideal of creativity rec-
ognises that ‘[h]uman action is neither the realization of norms nor the fulfill-
ment of drives: the individual is engaged in a continuous process of drawing 
boundaries and of opening them vis-a-vis other individuals and the collectives 
with which he is associated’ (Joas 1990, 185).
A final characteristic of rights claims that lies at the heart of the process by 
which solutions to social problems are conceived and deliberated is their fic-
tive, imagined character (Silva 2013, 468–469). Until rights are made “material” 
through their institutionalisation as binding laws, and the conferral of sym-
bolic significance onto them through codification in statutory form, they re-
main subject to the imagination, reimagination and denial of members of the 
political community. For example, the rigid distinctions drawn by countries 
between different groups of irregular migrants and their elevation of protected 
refugees over other categories of unprotected irregular migrants is the conse-
quence of a particular human rights imagination codified in response to spe-
cific historical legacies, including the aftermath of the Second World War. As 
such, the creative agency of socio-political actors in the ‘collective socio-legal 
practice of world-making’ around rights claims is made explicit (Silva 2013, 
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469). Consequently, rights claims can be characterised as ‘as powerful symbol-
ic political resources, from which concrete experiences of indignation can 
draw so as to criticize and transcend the existing social and political order’ 
(Silva 2013, 466).
 The Conflictual Theory of Law
The conflictual theory of law builds on the deeply social conception of laws 
defended in the previous section and the skad framework to analyse the pro-
cesses by which laws, as social institutions, are negotiated and institution-
alised. Hence, the conflictual theory of law is neither a genealogy of rights nor 
a school of jurisprudence. It is also distinguishable from legal pluralism, 
which regards the state as only one of many sources of law. Rather, the con-
flictual theory of law is concerned with how democratic societies deliberate 
laws through the parliamentary process. Despite its focus on the national 
 legislative realm, the conflictual theory of law is attuned to the significance of 
other political arenas, both at the supranational level and the intranational 
level.
The conflictual theory of law is structured around a reimagination of Hil-
gartner and Bosk’s public arenas model for assessing the ‘careers of social prob-
lems’ (1988, 53, 56). Originating in Blumer’s symbolic interactionist conception 
of social problems, the model was designed as an arena-centric attempt to 
study the evolution of social problem definitions in light of competition from 
other social problems. The conflictual theory of law evaluates the trajectories 
of social problems and, more importantly, the careers of solutions thereto 
within the realm of legislative deliberation. In reinventing the public arenas 
model, the conflictual theory of law engages with both the pragmatist aspira-
tions for legislative deliberation, emergent from the deeply social conception 
of laws and the analytical devices of the politics of knowledge (and its social 
construction), as identified by skad. These devices include subject position-
ing, practices, dispositifs and principles of symbolic ordering (Keller 2012). As 
such, the six pillars of the conflictual theory of law reveal different aspects of 
the processes by which social problems emerge and attain prominence as well 
as the processes by which their solutions are conceived, affirmed and institu-
tionalised as laws:
1. Competition among a large set of social problem and solution claims 
within the legislative process;
2. institutional arenas in which social problems and their proposed so-
lutions compete for attention and which confer epistemic privilege on 
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 actors, thus influencing the definition of social problems and possible 
legislative solutions thereto;
3. arena ‘carrying capacities’, which limit the number of problems and 
proposed solutions that can gain attention and legislative priority at any 
one time;
4. ‘principles of selection’ or institutional, political, and cultural factors, 
influencing the probability that competing problem and solution formu-
lations succeed within the legislative process;
5. patterns of arena interaction, which allow activities in one arena to 
spread to other arenas, for example through the interaction of media and 
politics; and
6. actors and their networks, which promote and seek to control indi-
vidual social problems and solutions and their definitions across several 
arenas.
As pillars of the conflictual theory of law, these six elements allow researchers 
to break down the socio-political processes underlying law-making and legisla-
tive amendment into their constituent elements and to analyse each element 
in turn. As hinted at above, each element is evaluated in light of its relation-
ship with the deeply social conception of laws as creative solutions to social 
problems arrived at by means of open-ended, inclusive and pluralistic inquiry 
among all those affected by the law in question. As such, the conflictual theory 
of law aligns with Putnam’s philosophical justification of democracy as the ‘the 
precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social 
problems’ and his commitment, not to a ‘universal theory of everything’ but to 
allowing the ‘best available knowledge of its own time and place’ to guide the 
resolution of social problems (2017, 251, 255). It also submits, contrary to classi-
cal liberalism, that the elimination of constraints does not itself lead to the 
emergence of rights (Putnam 2017, 262–263). Rather, the origins of rights 
claims lie in the identification of social problem experiences and, hence, rights 
as proposed ameliorations of social problem experiences have to be achieved 
and defended in light of other conceptions of social order (Pappas 2017, 85). As 
such, the rights claims of irregular migrants often challenge pre-existing self-
conceptions of nation states, both in terms of sovereignty and national iden-
tity (Hirsch and Bell 2017, 422). The remainder of this section expands upon 
the six pillars of the conflictual theory of law, commencing with competition 
among social problem claims.
The first pillar of the conflictual theory of law highlights the broad spectrum 
of possible social problems and solutions each representing ‘a specific inter-
pretation of reality from a plurality of possibilities’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 
57–58). Both problems and solutions are highly ‘stratified’ in accordance with 
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their ‘celebrity’ within legislative arenas and with the capabilities and promi-
nence of proponents of particular problem and solution conceptions therein. 
Equally, the longevity, disappearance or (re)emergence of each problem con-
ception and solution proposal within ‘public consciousness’ is extremely vari-
able and subject to a ‘highly selective process in which they compete with one 
another for public attention and societal resources’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 
57). Thus, the prospects of different social problem definitions as well as their 
purported solutions depend on the process of their collective definition within 
arenas, in which success results from competitions for attention. Within these 
arenas the competitive process between different social problems and solu-
tions occurs at two levels: First, different ‘substantive areas’, in which problems 
and their solutions can be defined, compete for the attention of publics, the 
media and politics. Second, within each ‘substantive area’, such as a state’s re-
sponse to increases in irregular migration, different definitions of the social 
problem attempt to (re)frame it in ways which implicitly or explicitly prefer 
one or another means of solving the problem (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 70). 
By  accounting for the careers of solutions within the legislative realm, the 
 conflictual theory of law goes beyond the public arenas model in explicitly 
recognising the lasting material impacts of definition and institutionalisation 
processes.
In contemplating social solutions, the conflictual theory of law incorporates 
Honneth’s insight of the pivotal significance of recognition, particularly within 
the legislative realm (2004). From this perspective, ‘distribution conflicts’ and 
‘recognition conflicts’ are never entirely distinct (Honneth 2004, 353), which 
implies, for example, that social problems defined around irregular migration 
and alleged “capacities” to accept asylum seekers are, in fact, claims about the 
recognition perceived by different groups within society. The conflictual theo-
ry of law submits that the importance of recognition claims and the resolution 
of ‘recognition conflicts’ within the legislative realm is best achieved using an 
inclusive deliberation process, which considers the articulation and reception 
of recognition claims as intrinsically valuable. Thus, as Honneth recognises, 
progress can be achieved in one of two ways: ‘either new personality portions 
are disclosed to mutual recognition, so that the degree of socially confirmed 
individuality increases, or a greater number of persons is included in the al-
ready existing recognition conditions, so that the circle of mutually recogniz-
ing subjects grows’ (2004, 361).
The definition of ‘social problems occurs not in some vague location such 
as society or public opinion. Rather, they arise in public arenas where social 
problems are framed and grow’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 58) and which 
range from parliaments to news media platforms, civil society, to courts and 
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 regulatory bodies. As a theory concerned with the negotiation of social prob-
lems and their solutions in the national legislative realm, the principal arena 
for the  conflictual theory of law are national parliaments (including their 
 various specialist committees). In addition to the principal law-making organs 
of the federal government, the news media constitutes an important arena of 
legislative deliberation since for ‘most members of the civil sphere, and even 
for members of its institutional elites’ the news media constitutes the ‘only 
source of firsthand experience they will ever have about the vast majority 
of their follow  citizens, about their motives for acting the way they do, the 
kinds of relationships they form, and the nature of the institutions they create’ 
(Alexander 2016, 1).
Similarly, supranational institutions such as the European Union (eu) and 
intranational decision making bodies in devolved systems of government or 
federal states contain parallel arenas to the national level, in which social 
problems and their solutions are negotiated in ways that prompt synergies and 
frictions with the national level. The institutional infrastructure of the eu cre-
ates a range of supranational arenas, including the European Commission, the 
European Council, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice 
(ecj) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as well as hundreds 
of specialist arenas. Unlike decisions made by other international bodies, the 
legally binding and directly effective nature of many eu decisions allows these 
arenas to shape and curtail the definition of social problems and their solu-
tions at the national level. For example, the ECtHR’s 2012 decision in Hirsi Ja-
maa and Others v Italy [gc], (Application No. 27765/09) set out binding criteria 
for achieving ‘individual, fair and effective’ refugee status determinations in 
the eu member states. At the same time, national governments are able to ex-
ercise considerable leverage over the problems and solutions derived in several 
eu arenas.
As such, the institutional arenas introduced in this subsection allow the 
conflictual theory of law to account for the contexts in which actors formulate 
means of symbolic ordering such as ‘horizons of expectations’, ‘specific visions’ 
and ‘speaker positions’ to dominate the definition of social problems and their 
solutions (Cantoni, Klaes, et al. 2018, 535, 538). Specifically, each arena’s insti-
tutional structures and logics of knowledge construction accord and distribute 
epistemic privilege on actors in accordance with their positions within hierar-
chies (based on rank or importance within an institution) or the resonance of 
their narratives with an arena’s intrinsic logics (for example “news-worthiness” 
in the media realm or “decisiveness” in parliamentary debates). The extent to 
which these structural factors exclude or silence individuals affected by the so-
cial problems and solutions negotiated within an arena, provide the  pragmatist 
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researcher with grounds for criticising existing legal orders and, thus, consti-
tute areas for potential moral growth.
As alluded to in the previous subsection, each institutional arena exhibits a 
maximum number of social problems and potential solutions per social prob-
lem that can be sustained at any one moment. Capacity can manifest in con-
crete terms through metrics such as the number of minutes accorded to a par-
ticular topic in a session of parliament, the number of columns accorded to a 
story in a newspaper or the airtime accorded to an issue on television but is 
also sensitive to less quantifiable metrics such as ‘surplus compassion’ (Hilgart-
ner and Bosk 1988, 59) and creativity, particularly for devising new solutions to 
social problems. Thus, the number of social problems ascertainable in an are-
na at any point in time does not typically reflect the number of material chal-
lenges encountered within that society, but the carrying capacity of the arena. 
Similarly, the emergence and career of a proposed solution to a social problem 
articulated in a given arena depends on the time and resources allocated to 
other solution proposals and, hence, the remaining capacity of the arena for 
novel solutions.
Thus, unless the carrying capacity of an arena is expanded, the increase in 
prominence of one social problem definition or solution proposal, will reduce 
the pervasiveness of its alternatives. As recognised by Keller, ‘the conflicts, is-
sues, commitments, and resources available for the definition of collective 
 situations—including things, actors, animals, objects, values, ways of doing, 
justifications, and so on—never cease’ (2017, 64). While some actors and re-
searchers may be in the business of ‘[p]retending that reality is the way it is 
and must be the way it is’ social change has transformative effects on the char-
acter and operating principles of institutional arenas, including through the 
introduction of new sub-arenas. Shifts in arena capacity and composition not-
withstanding, the conflictual theory of law suggests that political strategies 
can capture an arena both by absorbing its existing carrying capacity and un-
dermining other claims to the arena in question.
In light of this theorisation of institutional arenas and their carrying capaci-
ties, the conflictual theory of law is able to frame the space in which actors en-
gage with each other in relation to various subject areas. This acute awareness 
of the attributes of each arena facilitates the use of skad to analyse ‘[s]ocial re-
lationships of knowledge’ as the ‘complex sociohistorical constellations of pro-
duction, stabilization, structuration and transformation of knowledge within a 
variety of social arenas’ (Keller 2012, 59). As such, the ‘specific visions’ produced 
by actors to further their objectives are based on ‘established or emerging 
speaker positions’, which themselves derive from their institutional arenas and 
the constraints thereof. Thus, the combination of different institutional arenas 
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and their limitations paves the way for the theorisation of the tools, logics and 
strategies, which tend to prevail in the national legislative realm.
The principles by which a problem definition is adopted or a proposed solu-
tion is implemented by actors in a given arena are a direct consequence of 
limited arena capacities and conflicting definitions of social problems and so-
lutions therein. Hilgartner and Bosk recognise that selection criteria, such as 
‘the intense competition for prime space; the need for drama and novelty; the 
danger of saturation; the rhythm of organizational life; cultural preoccupa-
tions; and political biases’, play out differently in each arena, arena importance 
and carrying capacity being significant determinants of intra-arena competi-
tion (1988, 61). Timing and the operational sequencing of each arena, for ex-
ample by the news cycle or the segmentation of a parliamentary session, can 
also influence the effectiveness of a problem definition or a proposed solution 
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 62–63). The conflictual theory of law recognises, 
contra Hilgartner and Bosk, that even when arenas appear saturated with par-
ticular tropes and symbols, the combination of fear and appeals to cultural and 
political biases can suspend the need for novelty, particularly in legislative are-
nas that are driven by the logic of “decisiveness”.
As alluded to when setting out the institutional arenas of competition, the 
principles of selection operating within the arenas at the heart of the conflic-
tual theory of law are influenced by ‘asymmetric relationships of power’, which 
underlie ‘[s]ocial relationships of knowledge’, including the conferral of epis-
temic privilege on actors either because of their institutional rank or because 
of the resonance of their narratives within arena specific logics (Keller 2017, 
62). Rather than identifying any one type of social problem definition or solu-
tion proposal as automatically dominant across different arenas as well as mul-
tiple temporal and spacial contexts, Keller recognises that struggles over the 
‘definition of the situation’ are ‘conceived as crystallized effects of complex 
constellations and historical becoming that cannot be explained using a one-
theory-fits-all rationale’ (2017, 62, 64). Thus, the principles of selection in each 
historically and geographically contingent arena are attuned to the emergence, 
affirmation and amendment of power-laden subject positions, practices and 
dispositifs in the national legislative realm, as well as to the influence of other 
arenas on these processes. Phenomenological and narrative structures influ-
ence the careers of problem definitions and solution proposals by determining 
the themes and dimensions of possible social problems as well as their defini-
tional characteristics, causal relationships, actor identities, normative judge-
ments, consequences and action possibilities (Keller 2012, 68, 70). As such, dis-
course is used, for example, to cast actors as ‘heroes, rescuers, problem cases, 
sensibly, responsibly acting individuals, villains, and so on’ (Keller 2012, 68).
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The different arenas in which social problems and their solutions are nego-
tiated are interdependent and, hence, ‘[f]eedback among the different arenas 
is a central characteristic of the process through which social problems are 
developed’ (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 67). Feedback loops are the result of 
complex networks of interaction between the various arenas: Picture a parlia-
mentarian making a controversial statement about migrants on a primetime 
television program in order to influence subsequent parliamentary debates 
about proposed amendments to a Germany’s asylum law. These parliamentary 
debates will almost certainly be addressed and interpreted in later news broad-
casts and publications. Such interconnected arenas have the potential to pro-
duce synergies that can facilitate the dominance of a particular social problem 
or proposed solution in multiple arenas. Conversely, social problem definitions 
and proposed solutions may experience crowding out effects across different 
arenas, for example when a particular salient problem definition or solution 
proposal absorbs the carrying capacities of more than one arena, thereby 
starving off alternatives. Equally, one arena’s principles of selection may affect 
arenas that would otherwise have applied different selection criteria. For ex-
ample, parliamentarians might feel pressured to address polarising media dis-
courses around “dangerous”, unregistered migrants in parliamentary debates 
to avoid being viewed as irresponsive to the concerns of “the public”. Similarly, 
arenas at the national level are almost never independent from social problem 
definitions and proposed solutions at the intranational and supranational 
levels.
As such, actors in the German Bundestag might be enabled by claiming that 
a legislative solution would strengthen legal harmonisation across the eu or 
would pave the way towards common European standards. This tactic was em-
ployed by German parliamentarians of the conservative political spectrum in 
the early 1990s to argue that German asylum law was too generous and that 
such generosity inhibited eu-level cooperation on asylum related matters. 
Conversely, the failure of heads of state in the European Council to agree on 
binding quotas and a functioning distribution mechanism for irregular mi-
grants during the so called “refugee crisis” of 2015/16 put significant pressure on 
the governing coalition in the Bundestag to devise a national response to social 
problems constructed around the arrival of irregular migrants. At the same 
time, the scope for national solutions was constrained by eu level rules, such 
as the Schengen Agreement’s commitment to open borders within the eu and 
prescriptions regarding which country is formally responsible for a given ir-
regular migrant.
In light of these intranational, national and supranational arenas and their 
complex patterns of interaction, the conflictual theory of law recognises that 
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‘even if the tangled webs of social life powerfully influence our experiences 
and do much to shape our behaviour, identities and interests’ it is ultimately 
the individual actors within each arena that engage in creative action, thereby 
actively reconstituting social reality (Konings 2010, 59). Thus, arenas and the 
institutions that underpin them are never just negative constraints on indi-
vidual action (Konings 2010, 70), as experiences of institutions, resistances 
 encountered therein and institutional discrepancies with reality underpin cre-
ative action.
Given pragmatism’s recognition of actors’ agency in creatively reconstruct-
ing their social reality, the theorisation of actors and actor networks is a central 
component of the conflictual theory of law. ‘[A]ctors do not so much perform 
positions in a structure but rather pragmatically use the grid of institutional 
markers available to them: they rely on and employ publicly available norms 
and rules to improve their conceptual and practical grip on the world, in the 
process constructing their identities as social actors’ (Berger and Luckmann 
1966, 61 in Konings 2010, 66–67). The institutionalisation of any one rule or 
norm places the operation of social power relations both within and across 
arenas on a structural footing, thereby privileging the agency of some actors 
over others. When confronted with social change and associated challenges to 
the distribution of capacities and resources within existing arenas and their 
institutions, these challenges trigger questions about the adequacy of existing 
arrangements and the potential for creative innovation and social reconstruc-
tion (Konings 2010, 71–72).
The conflictual theory of law recognises that, while actors and actor net-
works can and do establish privileged positions for themselves, these positions 
remain contested as social problems and solutions are perpetually (re)defined, 
with each proposed definition implying different specialist actors and net-
works. As such, the increase in irregular migrants arriving in a country can be 
viewed, amongst other things, as predominantly an issue of labour market in-
tegration (experts including corporate executives and industry associations), 
border management and terrorism prevention (with experts in the police and 
the interior ministry), cultural preservation (experts being representatives of 
the “true people”) or human solidarity (with expertise conferred on volunteer-
ing organisations and civil society groups).
In line with these insights on the agency of actors and actor networks, 
the conflictual theory of law incorporates the skad framework’s theorisa-
tion of subject positions. Keller identifies that subject positions manifest in 
two ways: as the holders of ‘speaker positions’ and as ‘statement producers’ 
with varying levels of epistemic privilege and, second, as the ‘addressees of 
the statement practice’ (2012, 62). As anticipated by Berger and Luckmann 
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and the public arenas model, these subject positions manifest sociologically 
in the form of  ‘institutions, organizations, roles, and strategies of the individ-
ual or the collective’. However, subject positions are also discernible within 
discourse as  ‘positioning processes’ and ‘patterns of subjectivisation’ (Keller 
2012, 62). For instance, the characterisation of irregular migration as a “flood-
like” phenomenon, through the use of phrases such as “Migrantenstrom” 
(migrant-stream, author’s own translation), “Flüchtlingswelle” (refugee-wave, 
author’s own translation) and “Flüchtlingsflut” (refugee-flood, author’s own 
translation) in political and media arenas in Germany conceives of irregular 
migration as akin to a natural catastrophe. This depiction not only obscures 
the gravity and complexity of the causes of irregular migration and disindi-
viduates irregular  migrants, who become viewed part of one overwhelming 
“stream”, it characterises irregular migration as inherently severe and problem-
atic, thus requiring an urgent response. Irregular migrants, who are defined 
as externalities without individual or collective agency within Germany, are 
thus excluded from intersubjective social problem and solution negotiation 
processes.
To counteract this shortcoming of existing law-production processes across 
the world, the conflictual theory of law recognises citizenship as a fluid and 
dynamic concept. Fluidity and dynamism manifest in overlapping dual- 
citizenships, the advent of supranational eu-citizenship, shifts from recognis-
ing bloodline citizenship (ius-sanguinis) to birth-right citizenship (ius-soli) 
as well as the emergence of various forms of semi-citizenship or citizenship- 
 for-sale. As such, recognising fluidity and dynamism is both a recognition 
of changes in the reality of the practices and institutions of citizenship as 
well as an aspiration for how nation states should respond to the negotia-
tion of social problems and their solutions in realms that affect individuals 
other than the formal citizens of that country, including in response to ir-
regular migration. As reality is not stratified neatly into independent local, 
national and global layers, ‘one cannot simply disaggregate the various types 
of rights of the modern conception of citizenship and redistribute them ac-
cording to different levels of governance’ (Silva and Brito 2009, 74). Conse-
quently, political participation must be attuned to the empirical contexts in 
which the rights, actions and experiences commonly associated with citi-
zenship manifest. Thus, in the spirit of pragmatism’s commitment to open-
ended pluralistic inquiry among the widest possible group of inquirers, all 
members of a society however temporary and irrespective of formal citizen 
status should be recognised as legitimate participants in the legislative de-
liberation of social problems and solution proposals that have a direct effect 
on them.
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 Conclusion
This article contributes to the study of knowledge–creation within legisla-
tive  deliberations by introducing the conflictual theory of law as a way of 
 understanding laws as social struggles over meaning. The six pillars of the con-
flictual theory of law enable the researcher to break down the process of law-
production into its constituent elements, identifying the significance of actors, 
practices and arenas of social problem definition, negotiation and resolution 
therein. In contrast to natural law foundationalism, the institutionalised solu-
tions to rights and recognition claims are theorised as contextually situated, 
dynamic and contingent. The philosophical underpinnings of the conflictual 
theory of law in American Pragmatism allow the researcher to reject epistemic 
universals, while simultaneously pushing back against moral relativism. In 
fact, the pragmatist commitment to testing truth claims across as many differ-
ent experiences and inquirers as possible, allows the researcher to evaluate 
laws and law-making processes by examining whether legislative solutions to 
social problems were derived by means that were inclusive, participatory and 
open-ended.
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